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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the economics of the electricity market out to 2050. We propose a flexible 
zoning concept, built up around economic and technical layers, in networks of the order of 
hundreds of thousands or millions of nodes. The Economic Layer runs auctions to determine the 
electricity to be delivered and prices. The Economic Layer delivers suggestions after a fixed 
ordering, starting with suppliers and demands that generates the lowest overall system cost, then 
second-lowest overall network cost etc. These suggestions are delivered to the Technical Layer 
that checks for feasibility in terms of technical constraints. The first match between the ranked 
suggestions and non-violation of technical constraints is chosen. We demonstrate why this paper 
should be considered for future power systems.  This paper extends previous work on reactive 
power exchange by introducing market considerations in zoning mechanisms for active power 
exchanges. We are also exhibit the potential for much higher price resolution in distribution 
networks via our concept of economic zoning. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In order for society to meet its challenging CO2 reduction targets it is essential for 
energy systems to be decarbonised. There are many possible trajectories that can be 
envisaged for this transition and all of them require radical changes to the way electric 
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power is generated, transmitted and distributed not least due to the additional burdens 
presented by the electrification of heat and transport. One vision relies upon carbon 
capture and storage, interconnectors and large scale nuclear power coupled with heavy 
reinforcement of the grid infrastructure. A competing vision favours high levels of 
decentralisation of both generation and control using fast intelligent network management 
systems for dynamically defined sub zones of the network. This latter vision relies on 
flexibility on the demand and generation side, as well as the network, to deliver 
decarbonisation and promises to require much lower levels of network reinforcement. 
This decentralisation leads us to consider localised markets to assist with this flexibility. 
These markets could be for energy and for ancillary services. One consequence of this 
asset light, flexibility heavy vision is that it will result in a relatively higher network asset 
utilisation. This means that we would expect the network to place more frequent 
constraints on the flow of energy between generators and loads. Therefore this paper 
examines the possibility of a commercial-technical approach to local markets and 
network management by finding efficient market arrangements that can be delivered 
without infringing network constraints. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the role of economic 
zones in future networks with high degrees of operational flexibility and autonomy in 
decision making, reviews the current literature and highlights the paper’s contribution in 
this area. Section 3 reviews current electricity markets drawing examples from the USA. 
Section 4 presents the concept of flexible zones within our framework. Section 5 presents 
our results. An illustrative example is given. Section 6 discusses our framework and 
alternative uses of it. Finally, section 7 discusses possible extensions. 
 
2. Economic Zones in an Autonomic Power System 
Existing networks are not designed to cope with the challenges of high uncertainty and 
complexity that future networks are expected to face and are away from being ready to 
support the degree of controllability that may be required by 2050. Conventional 
networks are largely defined according to history, geography and legislation (McArthur et 
al., 2012). They are often treated as independent networks, however, their operation 
cannot be considered autonomous as network management does not currently involve 
significant artificial intelligence and learning mechanisms.  
The Autonomic Power System (APS) project focuses on the electricity network of the 
year 2050 (Alimisis et al, 2013; McArthur et al., 2012; Piacentini et al., 2013). This 
project investigates if the foreseeable network challenges of 2050 can be met by a fully 
distributed intelligence and control philosophy. The APS is envisaged as a self-healing, 
self-optimizing and self-protecting (hereafter self*) system. While these concepts are 
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often discussed in Smart Grid applications, the APS vision of network control and 
operation goes far beyond that (McArthur et al., 2012). 
An integral part of the APS research agenda is zones of control. A zone can be 
considered as a group of nodes and edges corresponding to physical elements, e.g. 
busbars and power lines (McArthur et al., 2012, p. 4). Although the zone sizes are not 
fixed, actual transmission networks can comprise thousands of buses, and can be 
segmented in dozens of zones consisting of hundreds of buses each. In conventional 
networks, these zones are able to exchange power and share constraints at their 
boundaries. However, these zones are static and do not change. The novelty of the APS 
concept in this area lies in the fact that these boundaries can be dynamic (hereafter 
flexible). This allows systems to achieve optimisation of multiple operations, but 
importantly, learn and adapt by themselves to new situations, such as due to a change in 
renewable generation or a network fault. This is a step forward compared to the current 
approach and respective control algorithms. A key aspect of the APS zoning approach 
lies in the increased operating flexibility at the transmission level, but this can also be 
extended and developed at the distribution level.  
So far in the APS narrative (Alimisis et al, 2013), the flexibility offered by flexible 
zoning accounts for technical operating constraints. In this paper, we include such 
considerations with respect to distribution network zones. We introduce the idea of 
economic zones in distribution networks as a collection of network nodes carrying 
monetary bids for energy not accounting at first for any technical constraints, but aiming 
to choose the lowest (possible) cost suppliers to match demands’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) to minimize overall network costs. Lowest cost is achieved in the long run by 
making use of energy auction bids3. 
This paper focuses on the distribution level and introduces two layers of control, each 
operating separately within zoning structures defined by either technical or economic 
criteria – we refer to these as the Technical Layer and the Economic Layer. The 
Economic Layer runs auctions to determine electricity to be delivered (hereafter quantity) 
and prices without taking into account technical constraints derived by the Technical 
Layer. The Economic Layer delivers suggestions after an initial ordering, starting with 
suppliers, connected supply and prices, demand, connected willingness to pay (WTP), 
that generates the lowest overall system cost (defined as suggestion 1, hence, independent 
of technical constraints, the collection of bids and therefore, the solution (quantity and 
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that minimizes total overall network costs. 
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prices) that the Economic Layer prefers the most4), second-lowest overall network cost 
(suggestion 2) etc. These suggestions are delivered to the Technical Layer that checks for 
feasibility in terms of technical constraints. The first match between the ranked 
suggestions and non-violation of technical constraints is chosen.  
Our Layers can be seen as two flexible zoning structures in a network containing, for 
example, of order 5,000 nodes (in a region significantly smaller than the PJM5 region in 
the USA), where the Technical Layer and Economic Layer combine suppliers and 
demands and set zones from period to period after checking technical and economic 
conditions. 
From a graph theory point of view (Chen, 1997), buses in transmission networks can be 
viewed as nodes (Chai, 2001) and therefore also as control points for setting (regulating) 
the price. The resolution of buses in the distribution network is much higher. Therefore in 
this paper we consider price control nodes (cleared in the auction) to be critical power 
flow and voltage control points, such as substations and large or aggregated suppliers and 
consumers. In order to provide an indication of these numbers, Table 1 summarises the 
current number of substations in the UK for voltage levels of 400kV, 132kV, 33kV, 11kV 
and 400/230V (ENA, 2015). For the discussion in this paper we are focusing our analysis 
in the distribution network at 11kV. This would result in a minimum of 4,800 nodes with 
5,000 to 30,000 customers each, but higher resolutions are possible.6 
Given vastly increased computer resources in the year 2050, these high resolutions for 
price formation could be considered, if necessary (because the increased transactions 
costs of higher price resolution would be very low). The deployment of smart grid 
solutions and technologies such as smart meters can facilitate price formation at higher 
resolution levels and also enable the active control of demand, generation and storage, 
providing improved network operational visibility. The rightmost column of the table 
depicts the typical number of customers supplied at every voltage level. An indication of 
the amount of visibility that will be required in future networks is the Government’s 
Smart Metering Implementation Programme aiming to roll out 53 million smart 
(electricity and gas) meters in Great Britain by the end of 2020 (DECC, 2013). 
 
 
                                           
4 In auction terms, see this as optimality (reversed) where the Economic Layer is a mechanism that searches 
for the solution which minimises total overall network costs. 
5  The area of PJM covers more than 3,000 nodes and has a demand roughly three times that of Great Britain 
We could also compare the 5,000 nodes to Great Britain (GB) that have 14 demand zones. For the GB as 
well, one could use a 33kV or a 69kV network (Frontier Economics, 2009).  
6 Higher resolutions of prices would require the possibility of separate prices at lower voltage levels. This is 
theoretically possible, but raises issues of how competitive the price resolution might be at lower voltages as 
the number of potential bidders declines. The benefits of such finer resolution of prices may not outweigh 
costs at lower voltages.	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Table 1: Potential number of nodes in a network 
Substation 
Type 
Typical Voltage 
Transformation 
Levels 
Approximate 
number 
nationally 
Typical Number of 
Customers Supplied 
Grid Grid 
Supply 
Point 
400kV to 132kV 380 200,000/500,000 
Bulk 
Supply 
Point 
132kV to 33kV 1,000 50,000/125,000 
Primary 33kV to 11kV 4,800 5,000/30,000 
Distribution 11kV to 400/230V 230,000 1/500 
 
There is literature on how to optimize electricity flow and/or minimize cost at the 
transmission level (McArthur et al., 2012; Alimisis et al., 2013; Hogan, 2002). However, 
work at the distribution level is scarce, presumably due to a lack of ideas on how a zoning 
structure can work at this level, and limited computer power to calculate quantities and 
prices at thousands of nodes. There are papers that look at the distribution level - two 
papers are good starting points for our discussion. AER (2011) examines the model as 
used at the transmission level in PJM and transfers it to the distribution level. The author 
suggests an almost identical model to the PJM model used in practice, but modifies it to 
include a premium price for renewable distributed generation. However, the paper does 
not include congestion variables (AER, 2011, p. 101). This is key point in our paper. 
Alimisis et al. (2013) discusses a flexible zoning structure at the transmission level but 
doesn’t consider markets. In Alimisis et al. (2013) it is proposed that zones are extracted 
as peer entities with potentially dynamic boundaries that appropriately respond to a 
control algorithm. A multi-layer analysis involving three layers i.e. observation, 
behaviour and computation is used to derive the nodes’ dependencies. The layers provide 
information to the zone determination technique, which in turn informs a partitioning 
method about prevailing dependencies and constraints. Alimisis and Taylor (2015) take 
this analysis one step further and propose a novel generic framework to assess different 
zoning methodologies in the context of co-ordinated voltage regulation (CVR). The 
framework is shown in Fig. 1a. Fig. 1b shows the zoning outcomes and pilot node 
identiﬁcation for a New England 39-bus test network used as a case study. At each 
iteration, blocks A and C effectively generate a system state, while blocks B, D, and E 
solve and evaluate the performance for that state. More specifically Block A generates a 
random state and solves a system-wide optimal power ﬂow algorithm. Block B integrates 
a zoning methodology into the framework. Block C creates voltage deviations and 
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provides the CVR with a voltage deviation vector-target to act upon. Block D contains 
the CVR strategy and block E evaluates the control decisions and decides if re-zoning is 
required. Even though Alimisis and Taylor (2015) focuses on the performance of four 
examined zoning methodologies — Hierarchical clustering with single distance (HCSD), 
hierarchical clustering with VAr control space (HCVS), spectral k-way (SKC), and fuzzy 
C-means (FCM) —, the proposed framework is generic and may accommodate any 
possible control model reduction methodology, data acquisition technique or control 
scheme. Furthermore, it takes into account the robustness of the zoning methodologies 
when topological changes occur to the network, as a change in topology can affect zones’ 
homogeneity of control and both inter- and intra-zone coupling. This is particularly 
important in the APS concept. In the APS goals are set and are then autonomously 
mapped on to objectives. For example, a goal could be to integrate a certain amount of 
wind energy over a number of hours. An objective arising from this could be to charge 
energy storage devices without violating line voltage constraints. The APS self* 
operation will thus determine appropriate zones of control and control algorithms to be 
deployed in the zones according to the objectives and the network would have to decide 
how to achieve the varying goals autonomously by re-configuring zones and changing the 
algorithms used in real-time while also taking into account past performance data. 
 
 
(a) 
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(b) 
Fig. 1. Technical zones in transmission a) Proposed framework for zoning methodology 
assessment (b) Zoning outcomes and pilot node identiﬁcation (Alimisis and Taylor, 2015).  
 
Alimisis et al. (2015)’s focus is on the transmission level and not the distribution level, 
it investigates reactive power and not energy and there is no market part of their design. 
In this paper we focus on real power and discuss market design. 
On economics, the closest paper to this one is Binetti et al. (2014). This studies an 
auction at the distribution level. The auction presented in their paper is an algorithm built 
on graph theory. Each unit on the network submits two bids: one bid for how much it has 
to spend to increase its generation from current value, and one bid for how much it can 
save by reducing its generation from the current value. Neighbouring units communicate 
and reach a consensus on final values for adding and moving an amount of power. 
Compared to the design presented in this paper, the authors do not use a conventional 
auction/market as seen the economic literature. Auctions/markets, rightly, worry about 
coordination of prices by market participants and explicitly forbid the sort of coordination 
discussed by Binetti et al. In our set up we use many bidders, and there is no negotiation 
between bidders after the auction has concluded. 
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We contribute to the literature on network design, by extending the work of McArthur 
et al. (2012) and Alimisis et al. (2015) to include distribution and at the same time to add 
economics to these papers’ control and operation algorithm. Following McArthur et al. 
(2012), we use the framework to assess different zoning methodologies and following 
Alimisis et al. (2015), we use a zoning technique. However, and compared to McArthur 
et al. (2012) and Alimisis et al. (2015), we introduce economic set-points (quantities and 
prices) - our Economic Layer’s suggestions – that work for thousands of nodes. From 
defined criteria, our Technical Layer gives us the optimal technical solution for a given 
economic solution. This interaction in technical terms at this more complex level has not 
been done before and has practical use in the context of suitably fast computer power, as 
we might expect in the year of 2050 and as assumed in this paper. 
 
3. Current electricity market – the USA 
 
The use of zones in the electricity system for technical and economic reasons already 
exists today. The North American electricity system is one example. The USA is of 
particular interest because of the use of nodal pricing. However, the use of nodes only 
covers the market at the transmission level, not at the distribution level. We want to 
introduce technical and economic zoning structures based on pricing nodes at the 
distribution level and we want to exploit an auction framework at this level.  
 
Transmission 
 
Most of the North American electricity market is split into regions and zones. Seven 
regions can be identified where each region is controlled by a regional transmission 
organization or independent system operator (RTO/ISO). PJM is one of these RTO 
regions, with an aggregate capacity of 167 GW (PJM, 2014a). PJM serves all or part of 
the state of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia and the District 
of Columbia. These regions can be seen as our zoning structures, both zones of control 
and economics. In term of zones of control, the RTOs/ISOs use dispatch algorithms to 
decide how each available resource should be operated given demand and constraints. 
The system dispatch is set, so that costs are minimized (FERC, 2012). PJM is built up 
around 3,000 nodes in the network down to 69kV (PJM, 2014b). PJM employs nodal 
pricing where there is a price for each node (locational marginal price, LMP). The 
schedules and LMP are set in the day-ahead market and the real-time market. In the day-
ahead market, schedules and prices are set for each hour one day ahead (FERC, 2012), 
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whereas the real-time market corrects for any differences between the schedule day-ahead 
and actual demand, subject potential constraints, unplanned outages etc. The day-ahead 
market uses auctions to set schedules and prices. The participants are generators that offer 
to sell electricity and demand-serving utilities that bid to buy electricity. The real-time 
market does not use market-based mechanisms (it uses existing bids) and can be seen as 
an administrative procedure. Actual conditions will vary from that forecast in the day-
ahead market, so RTOs/ISOs adjust technical and economical operation accordingly. 
Supply and prices are set at the more than 3,000 nodes throughout PJM (Frontier 
Economics, 2009). 
RTOs/ISOs also trade across regions. PJM has interconnections with, for example, 
Midwest ISO (MISO) and New York ISO (NYISO), where it imports and exports 
electricity. Cross-border trading is based on agreements between the regions. PJM and 
MISO as well as PJM and NYISO coordinate schedules and prices intended to reduce 
uneconomic flows between the regions. The agreement between PJM and MISO requires 
a joint clearing of schedules and prices, whereas the clearing process happens separately 
between PJM and NYISO (Groomes and Rustum, 2013). Transmission service request 
access is required from each region (Groomes and Rustum, 2013). 
 
Distribution 
 
PJM is responsible for the real time operation of the transmission grid within its area, 
while the operation of the distribution systems underneath it is undertaken by private 
utilities (about 75%), municipal utilities and cooperatives. However, besides defining the 
regional market, PJM has no duties in the distribution system. Each distribution utility is 
responsible for its own network and for undertaking the necessary investments. A 
consumer price is a combination of different components, including inter alia, wholesale 
power costs and the charges for transmission and distribution services. The transmission 
level wholesale prices are calculated at the 3,000 nodes, regulated by FERC, whereas the 
prices final distribution system customers pay are billed directly by the local utility to the 
consumer (Thomas et al., 2014). Each distribution service price is subject to price control 
and has to be approved by the state public utility commission (Thomas et al., 2014).  
 
Things to discuss from the current system 
 
The current nodal system at the transmission level effectively defines zones within the 
distribution system. This is problematic. It is also the case that there are boundary 
problems between PJM and other regional power markets. These regions and the zones 
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they give rise to are historically pre-defined and static. This lowers the flexibility to fully 
optimize the system. Trading across borders is used, but trades are based on fixed 
working agreements between regions. Furthermore, a transmission service request is 
required which is not market based. More importantly from our point of view, the 
transmission system contains 3,000 nodes, but if it was possible, more nodes (combined 
with more flexible zoning areas) could provide the necessary conditions for efficient trade 
(Newbery, 2006).  
The distribution level is part of the zoning structure defined at the transmission level 
and therefore, it shares its problems. It operates independently of the transmission level 
and in a system that is not based on how to optimize power flow or economics. Further, 
the distribution system does not use auctions to determine supply, demand and hence 
prices. It is a procedure approved by central bodies and therefore, it is not market based.  
The zoning structures presented in this paper and its flexibility will increase system 
reliability and allow us to potentially increase price resolution by an order of magnitude, 
relative to today7. This involves better supply and demand matching at each very narrow 
location (effectively an LMP) to ensure the lowest cost. 
 
4. Applying Economics in Technical Zones 
 
Based on section 2, we need a flexible network at the distribution level to meet both the 
economic and technical challenges of the future. We might think of this as central 
dispatch, but compared to current systems it is a mechanism that alone runs and tests the 
network.8 Hence, compared to current systems, where economic and technical constraints 
are controlled and actions are taken by the transmission and distribution system operators, 
it is a mechanism/an algorithm that controls and approves what actions and solutions to 
take. It is a self* network. The network is based on nodal pricing, a price at each node, 
with around 5,000 nodes in the GB case. Auctions determine schedules and prices. We 
operate using two zoning structures: zones defined from an economic point of view on 
the basis of submitted bids through an auction (the Economic layer) and zones defined 
from a control point of view and subject to technical constraints (the Technical Layer).  
 
 
 
                                           
7 5000/3000 nodes in GB vs PJM, in systems where demand is three times higher in PJM than GB. 
This gives a factor of 5 times greater price resolution. 
8 The price resolution process is run independently from the operation of the network in the sense 
that distribution grid owners cannot gain advantages for their own facilities (e.g. generation and 
storage) participating in the real energy auctions we describe.	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Definitions 
 
To define a zone from a control point of view, we use the argument of the authors in 
Alimisis et al. (2013, p. 260):  ‘a zone can be thought of as a physically connected 
collection of power elements that form a union that is strongly self-contained in terms of 
actions directed within the zone and by extension loosely affected from actions outside its 
boundaries, though not an electrical island, and can still be managed as a single group 
computationally to deliver a sufficiently optimised operation in real time, with regards to 
an hierarchy of objectives.’ 
Economic zones can be thought of as a conceptual collection of nodes defined by bids 
for energy at a given price. Economic zones are not subject to technical constraints, but 
are formulated as a result of a process that tries to minimize cost and therefore, minimize 
consumer prices by properly matching supply and demand. 
 
Methodology 
 
This paper argues in favour of localised zones – which are based on nodes in the 
distribution system where an algorithm searches to optimize power flow and at the same 
time searches to minimize cost. Although computer power resolution in price formation 
could scale up to millions of customers, this could be impractical from a controllability 
point of view and the additional monetary benefits of running an auction of that size 
might be questionable considering the infrastructure required and the additional 
computational complexity. 
The authors in McArthur et al. (2012) have already proposed that zones can be 
extracted as peer entities with potentially flexible boundaries that appropriately serve a 
control algorithm. A multi-layer analysis involving three layers i.e. observation, 
behaviour and computation is used to derive the nodes dependencies. The layers provide 
information to the zone determination technique, which in turn informs a partitioning 
method about prevailing dependencies and constraints. In Alimisis et al. (2015), the 
authors take this analysis a step further and propose a novel generic framework to assess 
different zoning methodologies particularly against CVR.  
Even though Alimisis et al. (2015) focuses on the performance of four examined 
zoning methodologies, it takes into account the element of robustness when topological 
changes occur to the network, as a change in topology can affect zones’ homogeneity to 
control and both inter- and intra-zone coupling. This is particularly important for the 
concept of this paper as the Technical Layer reacts to the Economic Layer and vice versa. 
As multiple bids can be submitted, the network conditions can significantly change and 
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zones need to be optimised against robustness to topological changes. The criteria 
suggested in Alimisis et al. (2015) for technical zoning refer to Controllability inside the 
zone, Interdependency between zones and the Relative Size of zones. Although in that 
paper the network size used as a case study was limited, the same criteria and 
consequently the same methodology can also be used if more complex networks are to be 
zoned, as in the case of the distribution system. 
The Economic Layer is controlled by auctions that deliver quantities and prices. 
Suppose the Economic Layer begins by considering all bids as being submitted in one 
zone. It only reacts on the bids submitted in the auctions in order to ensure lowest cost. 
The bids are submitted by suppliers and demands. The suppliers submit cost/potential 
prices to charge the consumers. The demands submit their willingness to pay (WTP) for 
electricity. From the submitted bids, the Economic Layer will suggest set-points to the 
Technical Layer in combinations from (1) a set that generates lowest overall cost 
(suggestion 1), (2) a set that generates second-lowest overall cost (suggestion 2) etc. The 
Technical Layer then checks if the combination generating lowest cost can be met 
without violating power and voltage constraints. If it doesn’t violate the constraints, this 
combination is chosen. If it does, then the next best solution suggested by the Economic 
Layer will be checked etc. The Economic Layer could in theory be resolved every minute 
and bidders could submit offers and bids in real time, hence, submit new offers and bids 
or resubmit offers and bids every second of the day. This would mean that an auction 
clears and determines quantities and price at each node every minute based on offers and 
bids submitted either in real time or valid for fixed for a period (e.g. one week).  Larger, 
more liquid, energy auctions could set quantity and prices to be delivered by supplies and 
demands, for example, 6 months ahead, if desired. This would allow reasonable price 
expectations of future nodal prices to be formed. Figure 2 and 3 show the interactions 
between the layers as a decision tree. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Interaction between Technical and Economic Layers. 
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Fig. 3. Decision tree in distribution. 
 
 
More precisely, the algorithm is a follows:  
1. The Technical Layer will inform the Economic Layer about overall demand 
and supply requirements. 
2. In order to determine quantities and prices, the system (not a supplier or a 
demander) runs an auction. The quantity and price are determined for every 
minute, and expected prices for future periods can also be computed. 
3. The Economic Layer will look at the submitted bids and deliver a number of 
suggestions, starting with lowest overall cost (suggestion 1), second-lowest 
overall cost (suggestion 2) etc. The Economic Layer delivers as many 
suggestions as there are combinations of the supplies and demands that meet 
the demand and supply equilibrium to the Technical Layer. 
4. The Technical Layer will check each suggestion to see if they can be delivered 
in technical terms, starting with suggestion 1. If suggestion 1 can be met based 
on defined technical criteria, it is chosen. If not, suggestion 2 will be checked 
etc. 
5. The algorithm will continue until a solution is reached. 
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5. An example 
 
The network used to illustrate the proposed approach is shown in Fig. 49, with bidding 
supplies and demands marked as S and D. The network is a modified version of an 
existing UK network considering anticipated changes in 2050 such as: 
• Increased Complexity. Reverse power flow is more likely to occur as a result of 
the large penetrations of distributed generation and energy storage. The topologies of 
networks will be more complex due to the increasing use of soft open points i.e. power 
converter devices that are able to regulate active and reactive power flows between 
interconnected lines, and potentially more frequent network reconfigurations. 
• Increased Uncertainty. Load and generation profiles are expected be more 
volatile and less predictable calling for the adoption of new techniques such as real 
time thermal rating and demand side response (DSR). 
• Increased size. Networks with larger sizes or in larger geographic areas need to 
be considered especially as the numbers of controllable devices will increase and with 
it the need for enhanced observability and measurements. 
• Increased Decentralisation and Active Participation. Future distribution networks 
are likely to be more decentralised due to the increasing number of distributed 
generation, microgrids, virtual power plants and community energy systems. More 
customers are expected to participate in the form of DSR and as producers. 
 
                                           
9	  This is a modified version of an 11kV UK distribution network. It consists of two primary substations and 
four 11kV feeders. Energy storage systems, soft open points and distributed generation has been included in 
order to simulate a future network configuration. D1-D6 are single or aggregated loads. S1, S3, S4 and S5 are 
individual supplies rated at 10MVA, 5MVA, 7.5MVA and 22.5 MVA respectively. S2 is a 2.5MVA/6 MWh 
energy storage system. Soft Open Points (SOP1-3) are rated at 3.5MVA each. They are used to regulate 
power flows between their end-points to satisfy requirements that could be triggered by events during 
network operation and/or as a result of power set-points suggested by auctions.	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Fig. 4. The Technical Layer checks the set-points for feasibility, 11 kV network. 
 
In the network considered there are two obvious zones of control: Control zone A and 
Control zone B, in this case interconnected by means of three soft open points (SOP1-3). 
We define SOPs according to Cao et al. (2016, p.36): ‘Soft Open Points (SOPs) are 
power electronic devices installed in place of normally-open points in electrical power 
distribution networks. They are able to provide active power flow control, reactive power 
compensation and voltage regulation under normal network operating conditions, as well 
as fast fault isolation and supply restoration under abnormal conditions’. In a future 
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scenario of enhanced renewables penetration these Zones could refer to communities that, 
although connected to the main grid through the 33/11kV substations, would operate in a 
way that could result in demand being satisfied by local generation. This could be driven 
by the need to absorb low carbon energy locally to avoid transmission losses, or due to 
the fact that the in the future the substations would have reached their nominal capacity; 
therefore, instead of network reinforcements, Operators have deployed ‘smart’ solutions 
like energy storage and DSR schemes implemented through market operations.  
Although the boundaries in the example, between technical zones are obvious i.e. 
Control zone A and Control zone B, a similar approach to the one followed in Alimisis 
and Taylor (2015) and described in the previous section can be followed to determine the 
optimal zoning from a technical perspective10 in more complicated networks resulting in 
any number of control zones. Although in this particular case these result in the obvious 
zones depicted in Fig. 4, they can also be used if more complex networks are to be zoned.  
In terms of the actual power exchange this is practically unregulated i.e. power can 
flow between any supplier and any consumer, provided this is technically feasible from a 
network operation perspective, as long as total supply always meets the total demand. 
Priority will be given for this power equilibrium to be maintained locally i.e. breakers 
B1-B5 and SOP1-SOP3 operation will be co-ordinated in a way that results in minimum 
power being exchanged with the 33kV network. From an economic point of view we can 
assign any demand to meet any supply and therefore economic zones can be determined 
from a cost optimisation point of view. However, this will result in the issuing of set-
points inside the technical zone, therefore, new zone suggestions must also fulfil 
technical criteria such as line and SOP ratings.   
Now, we will show how our Economic and Technical Layers work. An example is 
given. Suppose our area is built up in two zones of control –Control zone A and B (initial 
zones are the last period’s optimal power flow), where there are 11 bidders participating 
in the auction – six demands (D1-D6) and five suppliers (S1-S5)11. Three demands and 
four suppliers are in Control zone A and three demands and one supplier in Control zone 
B. Suppose the initial zoning structure is set where power flow is optimised. Assume the 
Technical Layer has informed the Economic Layer that overall demand in Control zone A 
is 12.5 MW and 10 MW in Control zone B. The initial Economic Zones will match the 
Control zones as shown in Fig. 4. Table 1 shows the submitted offers and bids in 
                                           
10	  This analysis is beyond the scope of this work. In this paper we base our technical zoning on the criteria 
suggested in Alimisis and Taylor (2015), which refer to Controllability inside the zone, Interdependency 
between zones and Relative Size of zones.	  
11 For example, S1 and S3 could be individual suppliers, S3 and S5 renewable generators, and S2 storage 
facilities. 
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Economic zone A. For example, the table shows that Demand 1 has submitted a WTP of 
120 pence for 5 MW (for 1 minute). The auction is resolved for each minute. 
 
Table 1: Submitted offers and bids in Economic zone A 
Demand MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Demand 1 5 120 
Demand 2 2.5 100 
Demand 3 5 90 
   
Suppliers MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Supplier 1 2.5 140 
Supplier 2 5 130 
Supplier 3 7.5 130 
Supplier 4 12.5 90 
Supplier 4 2.5 80 
 
Table 1 shows that Supplier 4 has submitted two separate bids: a bid to deliver 12.5 
MW at a price of 90 pence; and a bid to deliver 2.5 MW at a price of 80 pence. Since we 
are in an environment of many demands and suppliers, take the bid to deliver 12.5 MW 
and suppose, for example, that Supplier 4 is an aggregation of 13 smaller suppliers - 12 
have submitted a bid of 1 MW and one has submitted a bid of ½ MW, all MWs at a price 
of 90 pence/MW. Other suppliers and demanders could be seen in a similar way. 
Using a two-sided uniform-price auction12, Supplier 4 delivers 12.5 MW to Demands 1, 
2 and 3 at a price of 90 pence. Before using the flexible zoning structure, the cost in 
Economic zone A alone would be 1125 pence (12.5 MW*90 pence).  
 
Table 2 shows the offers and bids in Economic zone B. 
 
Table 2: Submitted offers and bids in Economic zone B 
Demand MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Demand 4 5 80 
Demand 5 2.5 50 
Demand 6 2.5 40 
   
                                           
12 A uniform-price auction is a multiple object format, where the price is found at 
the intersection point of the supply and demand curve (Krishna, 2009). 
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Suppliers 
MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Supplier 5 
12.5 50 
Supplier 5 
10 40 
Supplier 5 
10 40 
 
Again, using a two-sided uniform-price auction Supplier 5 delivers 10 MW to 
Demands 4, 5 and 6 at a price of 40 pence. At this price, the energy cost in Economic 
zone B alone would be 400 pence (10 MW*40 pence). Together with Economic zone A, 
total energy cost would be 1525 pence. 
Now, suppose that Supplier 5’s submitted bid of 12.5 MW can be delivered to 
Economic zone A at a price of 50 pence and Demand 5 can placed in Economic zone A 
and Demand 2 in Economic zone B. Imagine that the zoning structure re-configures to 
include Supplier 5 in zone A, Demand 5 in zone A and Demand 2 in zone B. Now, for 
zone A and B, we have Table 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3: Submitted offers and bids in Economic zone A after a re-configuration  
Demands MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Demand 1 5 120 
Demand 3 5 90 
Demand 5 2.5 50 
   
Suppliers MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Supplier 1 2.5 140 
Supplier 2 5 130 
Supplier 3 7.5 130 
Supplier 4 12.5 90 
Supplier 4 2.5 80 
Supplier 5 12.5 50 
 
 
Table 4: Submitted offers and bids in Economic zone B after a re-configuration  
Demands MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Demand 2 2.5 100 
Demand 4 5 80 
Demand 6 2.5 40 
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Suppliers MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Supplier 5 10 40 
Supplier 5 10 40 
 
In line with this the Economic Layer delivers the following two new suggestions to the 
Technical Layer, in addition to the result of the initial zoning. The first, in Table 5, 
reflects the results of Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 5: Suggestion 1 – lowest overall cost 
Zones MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Economic Zone A (new zone)   
Demand 1 5 120 
Demand 3 5 90 
Demand 5 2.5 50 
Supplier 5 12.5 50 
   
Economic Zone B (new zone)   
Demand 2 2.5 100 
Demand 4 5 80 
Demand 6 2.5 40 
Supplier 5 10 40 
   
Total cost  102513 
 
The Economic Layer has suggested a lowest cost of 1025 pence. To suggest the 
second-lowest overall network cost, the Economic Layer places one of Supplier 5’s 
submitted bids of 10 MW in Economic zone A, Demand 2 and Demand 4 in Economic 
zone A and Demand 3 and Demand 5 in Economic zone B. Now, for Economic zones A 
and B, we have Table 6 and 7. 
 
Table 6: Submitted offers and bids in Economic zone A after a second re-configuration  
Demands MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Demand 1 5 120 
Demand 2 2.5 100 
Demand 4 5 80 
   
                                           
13 12.5*50+10*40 = 625+400= 1025 pence. 
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Suppliers MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Supplier 1 2.5 140 
Supplier 2 5 130 
Supplier 3 7.5 130 
Supplier 4 12.5 90 
Supplier 4 2.5 80 
Supplier 5 10 40 
 
 
Table 7: Submitted offers and bids in Economic zone B after a second re-configuration  
Demands MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Demand 3 5 90 
Demand 5 2.5 50 
Demand 6 2.5 40 
   
Suppliers MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Supplier 5 12.5 50 
Supplier 5 10 40 
 
This second reconfiguration gives rise to a new suggestion from the economic layer 
shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8: Suggestion 2 – second-lowest overall cost 
Zones MW Cost (pence/MW) 
Economic Zone A (new zone)   
Demand 1 5 120 
Demand 2 2.5 100 
Demand 4 5 80 
Supplier 4 2.5 80 
Supplier 5 10 40 
   
Economic Zone B (new zone)   
Demand 3 5 90 
Demand 5 2.5 50 
Demand 6 2.5 40 
Supplier 5 10 40 
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Total cost  140014 
 
The Economic Layer has now delivered three suggestions – a lowest cost of 1025 
pence, a second-lowest cost of 1400 pence and the initial zoning structure at a cost of 
1525 pence. 
Now, the Technical Layer checks the set-points for feasibility. Suggestion 1 results in 
supply S5 increasing its power output as a response of a request generated in a different 
zone i.e. Control Zone A. Furthermore S1-4 would need to re-adjust their outputs to meet 
the demand that is not participating in the auction. This in essence constitutes a re-
configuration of the control zones. As S5 now provides power to all Demands 
participating in the auction this could now result in two different zones of Control as 
shown in Fig. 5a, provided controllability is maintained using flexibility provided by 
assets such as the SOPs. However, based on power flow calculation, in this conceptual 
example this would result in the power between the two zones exceeding the nominal 
capacity of SOP1. Hence, the Technical Layer rejects Suggestion 1. Suggestion 2 is 
examined which results in the zoning shown in Fig. 5b. As there is no exceeding of 
technical constraints throughout the network, Suggestion 2 is therefore feasible. 
Suggestion 2 is accepted by Technical Layer. 
       
(a)                                                            (b) 
Fig. 5 Suggested zones after re-configuration a) Suggestion 1 b) Suggestion 2. The reader 
is encouraged to refer to section 4 paragraph 2, above, for a definition of control and 
economic zones. 
  
                                           
14 12.5*80+10*40 = 1000+400= 1400 pence. 
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6. Discussion 
 
We have shown that locational marginal prices (LMPs), auctions and our flexible zones 
could be the way towards a lowest cost electricity system. Importantly, our set-up can 
improve on the outcome in a world of pre-defined, fixed and/or static electricity 
networks. That said, there could be a mismatch between the lowest system cost, and what 
is possible taking into account control and operation is. Using economics to drive zone 
re-configuration could result in drastic changes in the setting of control zones, however, 
provided the enhanced flexibility offered by assets in 2050 we have shown that this could 
be a viable option. 
The use of zones can be analysed three ways: (1) only in terms of control and operation 
without taking into account the economics when determining zones; (2) only in terms of 
economics without taking into account the control and operation technique when 
determining zones; (3) a mix between control and operation and economics when 
determining zones. 
Approach (1) is analysed in Alimisis et al., (2013) and Piacentini et al., (2013), (2) is 
an alternative approach to the problem and approach (Krishna, 2009) (3) is the most 
desirable scenario, and what has been analysed in this paper.  
 
6.1. Feasibility 
 
One might wonder whether or not our economic set up could be used after an 
optimisation of control and operation. The answer is yes. The control and operation set 
boundaries for the power flow. If the Technical Layer allows room for lower overall cost, 
our algorithm aims to find it. If not, we already have the lowest possible cost. In any case, 
the market (boundaries and bidders) decides which configuration ensures lowest feasible 
cost. 
 
6.2. Number of zones  
 
Then we may ask: What is the minimum/maximum number of zones? Following the 
discussion above, the minimum or maximum number of zones is determined by the 
Technical and Economic Layers. The Economic Layer will determine prices and 
therefore, who are the cheaper suppliers. The Technical Layer determines the number of 
zones. The number zones depend on bids, demand and constraints. 
 
 
 23 
7.  Extensions 
 
In this paper, we presented a method that can secure a lowest cost in a system made up 
of many local power zones. Our zoning structure reacts if the control and operation 
allow/require it. However, this does not necessarily suggest that it should be like this. 
There could be a welfare improvement and lower cost by letting control and operation 
follow the economics. A further extension could be to take the technical part of this paper 
and look at it through a Multi-Agent System (Cameron et al. 2015) at the distribution 
level and add economics. The aim of such a follow-on paper should be to demonstrate 
that network conditions, including market constraints and considerations, can be used not 
only to determine the most appropriate control and communication architecture from a 
technical perspective, but also to trigger architectural changes in the Technical Layer in 
order to maximize economic benefits.  
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